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Abstract
We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division
rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and
Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be de-
scribed in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a
fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for a given claims vector, the
path of awards for that claims vector is simply the monotone path truncated
by the claims vector. Second, a rule is identified with a set of parametric func-
tions indexed by the claimants, and for a given claims problem, each claimant
receives the value of his parametric function at a common parameter value, but
truncated by his claim. Third, a rule is identified with an additively separable,
strictly concave social welfare function, and for a given claims problem, the
amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function subject to the
constraint of choosing a feasible award. This third way of describing the family
of rules is similar to Lensberg’s (1987) solution for bargaining problems applied
to conflicting claims problems.
1 Introduction
A conflicting claims problem is a situation in which a divisible homogeneous good
must be distributed among a group, each individual in the group having an objective
claim on the good, but where the amount of the good is insufficient to satisfy all the
claims. An example is dividing the liquidated value of a bankrupt firm among its
creditors. How should the good be divided among the claimants? We seek a rule
which chooses, for any problem, a feasible allocation or award. (A feasible award is
one in which every individual receives an amount between 0 and his claim, and which
completely exhausts the good to be divided.)
∗I thank Atila Abdulkadirog˘lu, Bhaskar Dutta, Peter Hammond, and Herve´ Moulin for useful
discussions.
†Email: J.Stovall@warwick.ac.uk
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1.1 Overview of Results
We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (henceforth IIA) on
rules. This axiom states that if the chosen award for a problem is also feasible for
a second problem whose feasible set is a subset of the original problem, then that
award is also chosen for the second problem. This is the same axiom originally used
by Nash (1950) in the domain of bargaining problems. In the context of individual
choice, this axiom is sometimes known as Chernoff’s condition (Chernoff, 1954) or
Sen’s a (Sen, 1969).
We also impose two axioms that are common in the literature: Consistency and
Resource Monotonicity. Consistency states that if a division rule chooses an award
for a group of claimants, then it should not choose to reallocate the awards of any
subgroup when considered as a separate problem. Resource Monotonicity states that
if the amount to be divided increases, then no claimant’s award should decrease.
Theorem 1 shows that IIA, Consistency, and Resource Monotonicity characterize
a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways:
• Consider a fixed, weakly monotone path in the space of awards. For any group
of claimants and any vector of claims for that group, the path of awards is
simply the fixed path truncated by the claims vector. We refer to all such rules
as monotone path rules.
• Consider a set of parametric functions, one for each individual. Each paramet-
ric function depends only on a single parameter, in which it is weakly increas-
ing. For any problem, each parametric function is truncated by the individual’s
claim, and a common parameter is found so that the sum of the truncated para-
metric functions evaluated at that parameter equals the amount to be divided.
We refer to all such rules as claims independent parametric rules.
• Consider an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function. For
any problem, the amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function
subject to the constraint of choosing a feasible award. We refer to all such rules
as collectively rational additively separable (henceforth CRAS) rules.
We also consider a property which is dual to IIA. Rather than taking the awards as
what matters to the individuals, as IIA does, this dual property takes the losses (the
difference between an individuals claim and his award) as what matters. Theorem
2 shows that IIA and its dual are effectively incompatible: the queueing rule is the
only rule to satisfy Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, IIA, and the dual of IIA.
If there is no a priori reason to treat the claimants differently, then one would
want the rule to give the same award to individuals with the same claim, a property
known as Symmetry. Theorem 3 shows that the constrained equal awards rule is the
only rule in our family which satisfies Symmetry. Additionally, we consider the case
where each individual has not just a claim on the good to be divided, but also some
endowment which cannot be taken from him. In such a case, it may be reasonable
to treat individuals with the same claim differently because of differing endowments.
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We characterize the rule which, when not bound by feasibility constraints, equalizes
the sum of awards and endowments for all individuals.
1.2 Related Literature
To our knowledge, the only other work to consider IIA in the domain of claims
problems are a pair of papers by Kıbrıs (2012, 2013). From these papers, the result
closest to ours (Kıbrıs, 2012, Theorem 3) is one which characterizes the family of rules
that maximize some social welfare function (not necessarily additively separable). The
axioms imposed by Kıbrıs are IIA, Continuity, and an axiom called Others-oriented
Claims Monotonicity. In general, these rules are not Resource Monotonic. Another
way in which this result differs from ours is that the population of claimants is fixed,
and thus Consistency does not apply.
Recently, Stovall (2013) characterized the family of (asymmetric) parametric rules,
of which the claims independent parametric rules are a special case. The family of
symmetric parametric rules (Young, 1987) is also a special case of the family of
parametric rules. The only overlap between the family of symmetric parametric rules
and the family of claims independent parametric rules is the constrained equal awards
rule (see Theorem 3). Additionally, Stovall shows that a parametric rule maximizes
an additively separable and claims dependent social welfare function. This differs
from our result as Theorem 1 characterizes a rule which maximizes a social welfare
function which does not depend on the claims.
Considering other domains, the monotone path rules and the CRAS rules each
have analogues in the literature on the bargaining problem. Monotone path rules are
similar to the solutions given by Thomson and Myerson (1980), though they consider
only strictly monotone paths and a fixed population. CRAS rules are analogous to
the family of rules characterized by Lensberg (1987). Since the domain of bargaining
problems is much richer than the domain of claims problems, it should come as no
surprise that these families of rules are not equivalent in the domain of bargaining
problems. The main axiom imposed by Thomson and Myerson is a strong monotonic-
ity axiom, which would be equivalent to a strict resource monotonicity axiom here.
The main axiom imposed by Lensberg is a consistency axiom similar to the one we
impose. Interestingly, in the domain of bargaining problems and in conjunction with
Lensberg’s other axioms, this implies IIA.
In the literature on fair division under single-peaked preferences, Moulin (1999)
characterizes the family of monotone path rules. The key axioms are a consistency
axiom and resource monotonicity axiom (similar to the ones we impose), and, because
of strategic considerations for an individual reporting his peak, a strategy-proofness
axiom.
This work joins a growing literature studying asymmetric rules for the claims prob-
lem. In addition to the work by Stovall and Kıbrıs discussed above, Moulin (2000),
Naumova (2002), Chambers (2006), and Hokari and Thomson (2003) all consider
rules which are not symmetric.
For a recent survey of the literature on the claims problem, see Thomson (2013).
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Figure 1: Path of awards. The path of awards is the set of all awards as the
endowment varies from zero to the sum of claims.
2 Definitions
We adopt the following notation. Let N denote the set of finite subsets of the natural
numbers, N. Let R+ denote the non-negative real numbers, R++ the positive real
numbers, and R the extended real numbers. Let 0 denote a vector of zeros and Ω a
vector in which all coordinates are +∞. For x, y ∈ RN , we use the vector inequalities
x = y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N , x ≥ y if x = y and x 6= y, and x > y if xi > yi for every
i ∈ N . Also, let x ∧ y denote the meet of x and y, i.e. x ∧ y = (min{xi, yi})i∈N . For
N ′ ⊂ N , let xN ′ denote the projection of x onto the subspace RN ′ .
A claims problem is a tuple (N, c, E), where N ∈ N , c ∈ RN++, and E ∈ R+, all
satisfying
∑
i∈N ci ≤ E. Let X(N, c, E) denote the set of efficient feasible awards
vectors for the problem (N, c, E), i.e.
X(N, c, E) ≡
{
x ∈ RN+ : 0 5 x 5 c and
∑
i∈N
xi = E
}
.
A division rule is a function S such that for every problem (N, c, E), we have
S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N, c, E).
Some well-known rules include the proportional rule, the constrained equal awards
rule, the constrained equal losses rule, the Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985),
and the queueing rule. The constrained equal awards and queueing rules are members
of the family which we characterize, while the others are not.
A convenient way of graphically representing a rule is by the path of awards it
generates. For a fixed N ∈ N and c ∈ RN++, the path of awards generated by S is the
set of all awards S(N, c, E) as E varies from 0 to the sum of claims
∑
N ci. See Figure
1. Thus a rule can be identified with a collection of paths, one for every N ∈ N and
every c ∈ RN++.
4
3 Main Results
In this section we introduce the axioms imposed and the family of rules which are
characterized by those axioms.
3.1 Axioms
We impose three axioms. The first states that increasing the amount to divide should
not cause any claimant’s award to decrease.
Resource Monotonicity. For every (N, c, E) and E ′ < E, we have S(N, c, E ′) ≤
S(N, c, E).
The next axiom states that how a rule divides between two claimants does not
change if all other claimants are removed from the problem.
Bilateral Consistency. For every (N, c, E) and {i, j} ⊂ N , if x = S(N, c, E), then
(xi, xj) = S({i, j}, (ci, cj), xi + xj).
A more general version of this axiom called Consistency holds for any N ′ ⊂ N .
Our final axiom axiom is well-known and has been used in many other contexts.
It states that if the solution to a problem is feasible for a different problem with a
smaller feasible set, then it will be the solution to this second problem.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. For every (N, c, E) and (N ′, c′, E ′),
if X(N ′, c′, E ′) ⊂ X(N, c, E) and S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N ′, c′, E ′), then S(N ′, c′, E ′) =
S(N, c, E).
We abbreviate the name to IIA. Given the structure here, it is easy to more
precisely characterize the conditions of IIA. Given S and (N, c, E), the set of all
(N ′, c′, E ′) such that X(N ′, c′, E ′) ⊂ X(N, c, E) and S(N, c, E) ∈ X(N ′, c′, E ′) is
precisely the set of all (N ′, c′, E ′) such that N ′ = N , E ′ = E, and S(N, c, E) 5 c′ 5 c.
Thus IIA can alternatively be written as:
For every (N, c, E) and (N, c′, E) satisfying S(N, c, E) 5 c′ 5 c, we have
S(N, c′, E) = S(N, c, E).
IIA is undoubtedly a strong assumption. In essence, it states that the division rule
should assign allocations independently of the claims problem at hand. For example,
suppose (N, c, E) and c′ satisfy the conditions of IIA. Suppose further that c′j = cj for
all j 6= i and that c′i < ci. IIA says that since the division rule deemed x = S(N, c, E)
a just allocation for the problem (N, c, E), then it must deem x a just allocation
for (N, c′, E). The fact that the claim of individual i decreased does not alter this
assessment since x is still feasible for the problem (N, c′, E).
Note that this argument takes for granted the idea that it is the awards that
matter. Thus IIA would not be as compelling in applications where the award is
actually a bad, e.g. fair taxation. (Taxation problems are formally identical to claims
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Figure 2: Monotone Path Rule. For two claimants, a monotone path p, as well
as the truncated paths for claims c and c′.
problems: c is interpreted as the vector of incomes, E is interpreted as the revenue
that must be raised via taxation, and S(N, c, E) is the assignment of taxes.) We will
return to this point in Section 4.
In the context of individual choice, IIA is considered to be a standard rationality
assumption. Thus one can think of IIA as imposing some amount of “rationality” on
the social choice function S. One may then wonder what the implications would be
of assuming the stronger axiom WARP. Given the structure here, it is not difficult to
show that IIA and WARP are in fact equivalent.
3.2 Monotone Path Rules
We describe here a family of rules defined from a monotone path.
For M ⊂ N and for x, y ∈ RM , a path from x to y is a continuous function
p : [0, 1]→ RM such that p(0) = x and p(1) = y. A path is weakly monotone if t > t′
implies p(t) = p(t′). Let P denote the family of weakly monotone paths in RN+ from
0 to Ω. Call p ∈ P a monotone path.
For a given p ∈ P , N ∈ N and c ∈ RN++, let pc denote the path from 0 to c
obtained by taking, for every t, the meet of c and the projection of p(t) onto RN+ , i.e.
pc(t) ≡ pN(t) ∧ c.
See Figure 2.
Note that for any N ∈ N and c ∈ RN++, the function
∑
i∈N p
c
i(t) is continuous,
weakly increasing, and satisfies
∑
i∈N p
c
i(0) = 0 and
∑
i∈N p
c
i(1) =
∑
i∈N ci. Hence,
for any problem (N, c, E), there exists t ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑i∈N pci(t) = E. Moreover,
if t and t′ are such that
∑
i∈N p
c
i(t) =
∑
i∈N p
c
i(t
′) = E, then pci(t) = p
c
i(t
′) for every
i ∈ N . Hence for any p ∈ P , we can define a division rule Sp as:
Sp(N, c, E) = pc(t),
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Figure 3: Claims Independent Parametric Rule. The parametric functions for
two claimants.
where t is chosen such that
∑
i∈N p
c
i(t) = E. We say a rule S is a monotone path rule
if there exists p ∈ P such that S = Sp.
3.3 Claims Independent Parametric Rules
Let F denote the family of functions f : N×R→ R+ such that, for any i ∈ N, f(i, ·)
is continuous, weakly increasing, and satisfies f(i,−∞) = 0 and f(i,+∞) = +∞.
From now on we write f(i, ·) as fi.
Note that for any N ∈ N and c ∈ RN++, the function
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} is
continuous and weakly monotonic in λ, and that
∑
i∈N min{fi(−∞), ci} = 0 and∑
i∈N min{fi(+∞), ci} =
∑
i∈N ci. Hence, for any claims problem (N, c, E), there
exists λ ∈ R such that ∑i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} = E. Furthermore, if λ and λ′ are
such that
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} =
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ′), ci} = E, then it must be that
min{fi(λ), ci} = min{fi(λ′), ci} for every i ∈ N . Hence for any f ∈ F , we can define
a division rule Sf as:
Sf (N, c, E) = (min{fi(λ), ci})i∈N ,
where λ is chosen such that
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} = E. We say a rule S is a claims
independent parametric rule if there exists f ∈ F such that S = Sf . See Figure 3.
The claims independent parametric rules are a special case of the (asymmetric)
parametric rules characterized by Stovall (2013). In that paper, a parametric function
was a continuous function g : N×R++ ×R which was weakly increasing in the third
argument and satisfying gi(ci,−∞) = 0, gi(ci,+∞) = ci. Thus the more general
parametric functions depend not only on the parameter but also on the individual’s
claim. A division rule could be defined from such a function as was done above. Thus
the parametric function g is a claims independent parametric function if for every
i ∈ N, ci > 0, and λ ∈ R, there exists f ∈ F such that gi(ci, λ) = min{fi(λ), ci}.
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As we show later in Theorem 1, monotone path rules and claims independent
parametric rules are in fact the same family of rules. Indeed, this is easy to see now.
For f ∈ F , define the monotone path
p(t) = (fi(g(t)))i∈N
where g is any strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R. Showing the converse is
similar.
3.4 Collectively Rational Additively Separable Rules
A social welfare function (SWF) is a real-valued function of awards vectors. We say a
SWF is additively separable if there exists U : N×R+ → R such that for any N ∈ N
and x ∈ RN+ , the SWF can be written in the form
∑
i∈N U(i, xi). Let U denote the
family of functions U : N× R+ → R that are continuous and strictly concave. From
now on we write U(i, ·) as Ui.
Note that for any U ∈ U , arg maxx∈X(N,c,E)
∑
i∈N Ui(xi) is single-valued. Hence
for any U ∈ U , we can define a division rule SU as:
SU(N, c, E) = arg max
x∈X(c,E)
∑
i∈N
Ui(xi).
We say a rule S is a collectively rational additively separable (CRAS) rule if there
exists U ∈ U such that S = SU .
The family of CRAS rules are similar to the family of rules characterized by
Lensberg (1987) for the Nash bargaining problem.1 Indeed, it is easy to see that any
claims problem is also a Nash bargaining problem. However Lensberg’s result does
not imply ours as the class of Nash bargaining problems is much larger than the class
of claims problems.
3.5 Theorem
Our main theorem states that these three axioms characterize each of these families
of rules, and thus these families are in fact one and the same.
Theorem 1 The following are equivalent:
1. S satisfies Resource Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, and Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
2. S is a monotone path rule.
3. S is a claims independent parametric rule.
4. S is a CRAS rule.
1Lensberg requires the SWF to be only strictly quasi-concave. Strict concavity is needed here to
guarantee Resource Monotonicity.
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The proof is in the appendix (with all subsequent proofs).
We note a few things concerning this theorem. First, it shows the appeal of this
family of rules as it can be described in three different but intuitive ways. Monotone
path rules are geometrically appealing. Claims independent parametric rules are
easy to relate to the family of parametric rules. CRAS rules are a natural method of
division, one that has been proposed in many other social choice problems.
A second thing to note is that continuity of the rule is not assumed, though it is
implied by the axioms. It is a well-known result that Resource Monotonicity implies
continuity in the endowment, and this fact is used in the proof. The other part of
continuity, that of continuity in the claims vector, is not needed in the proof (though
obviously IIA would play a key role in establishing this property).
The following examples demonstrate that the axioms in Theorem 1 are indepen-
dent.
• Bilateral Consistency. Let p, p′ ∈ P be two different monotone paths. Con-
sider the rule which divides according to Sp for all two-person claims problems
and Sp
′
for all claims problems with more than two claimants. Such a rule
would satisfy Resource Monotonicity and IIA but not Bilateral Consistency.
• IIA. The proportional rule
P (N, c, E) =
E∑
N ci
c
satisfies Bilateral Consistency and Resource Monotonicity, but not IIA.
• Resource Monotonicity. We sketch an example here, but a complete ex-
ample is given in the appendix. Consider a rule for only two claimants. This
rule divides according to a fixed path, which is not weakly monotone. Specifi-
cally, this path is always increasing in the first claimant’s coordinate, but does
sometimes decrease in the second claimant’s coordinate. However it never has
a slope less than −1, thus guaranteeing that it intersects with any endowment
line only once. Given this fixed path, we now describe the path of awards for a
given claims vector. For (c1, c2) ∈ R2++, the path of awards is the intersection
of the the fixed path with the rectangle defined by the origin and (c1, c2). If the
fixed path exits and then subsequently re-enters the rectangle, then the path of
awards travels along the border of the rectangle from the point of exit to the
point of entry. Once the fixed path leaves the rectangle permanently, the path
of awards travels along the border of the rectangle from the point of exit to the
point (c1, c2). See Figure 4. We have thus described the path of awards for any
claims vector, and thus completely described the rule for two claimants. Such a
rule satisfies IIA but obviously not Resource Monotonicity. In the appendix, we
describe how this rule can be extended to any problem so as to satisfy Bilateral
Consistency.
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Figure 4: Violation of Resource Monotonicity. The path is not monotone, and
so Resource Monotonicity is violated. A path of awards is shown in bold for the claims
vector c.
4 Duality
An alternative way of viewing a claims problem is how to divide up the losses. Since
the losses for the problem (N, c, E) is E −∑N ci, we define the dual of (N, c, E) as
the problem (N, c,
∑
N ci −E). Let L(N, c, E) denote the set of efficient feasible loss
vectors for the problem (N, c, E), i.e.
L(N, c, E) ≡
{
x ∈ RN+ : 0 5 x 5 c and
∑
i∈N
xi =
∑
i∈N
ci − E
}
.
Note that for every (N, c, E), we have X(N, c, E) = L(N, c,
∑
N ci − E), which is to
say that the set of feasible awards for a problem is equal to the set of feasible losses
for the dual of that problem. The dual of the rule S is
Sd(N, c, E) ≡ c− S(N, c,
∑
i∈N
ci − E).
Thus Sd allocates losses the same way that S allocates gains, and vice versa. The
dual of the axiom A is the axiom Ad such that
S satisfies A if and only if Sd satisfies Ad.
One can show that the dual of Consistency is Consistency itself. Similarly, the dual
of Resource Monotonicity is itself. This is not true of IIA.
IIA-Dual. For every (N, c, E) and (N ′, c′, E ′), if L(N ′, c′, E ′) ⊂ L(N, c, E) and
c− S(N, c, E) ∈ L(N ′, c′, E ′), then c′ − S(N ′, c′, E ′) = c− S(N, c, E).
Similar to IIA, we can more precisely characterize the conditions of this axiom.
Namely, the conditions are met if N = N ′,
∑
ci − E =
∑
c′i − E ′, and S(N, c, E) 5
c′ 5 c.
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Thus IIA-Dual treats losses as what matters, and so would be more normatively
appealing in applications in which the resource to be divided is actually a bad.
It is easy to see the implications of replacing IIA with IIA-Dual in Theorem 1.
Namely, the result would be a rule which divides losses according to the monotone
path rule. However what would be the result if IIA-Dual was added to the axioms in
Theorem 1? Since the intuition behind IIA and IIA-Dual are somewhat incompatible,
the result is a rule which is usually considered to be normatively unappealing.
The queueing rule divides the endowment by lining up the claimants in a queue
and then awarding the first person in the queue his full claim, then the second person
his full claim, and continuing until the endowment is exhausted. Let L denote the
set of strict linear orders over N . For ∈ L, define the rule S as:
S(N, c, E) =
(
min
{
ci,max
{
0, E −
∑
j∈N :ji
cj
}})
i∈N
We say a rule S is a queueing rule if there exists ∈ L such that S = S.
Theorem 2 The rule S satisfies Resource Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA,
and IIA-Dual if and only if S is a queueing rule.
5 Symmetry
If there is no a priori reason to treat the claimants differently, then one would want
the rule to give the same award to individuals with the same claim. This is captured
in the following axiom.
Symmetry. For every problem (N, c, E) and {i, j} ∈ N , if ci = cj, then Si(N, c, E) =
Sj(N, c, E).
The constrained equal awards rule is the rule that gives everyone the same award,
unless that award is more than a claimant’s claim in which case that claimant gets
his full claim:
CEA(N, c, E) = (min{ci, λ})i∈N
where λ is chosen such that
∑
N CEAi(N, c, E) = E. It should be obvious that
the constrained equal awards rule is a claims independent parametric rule and that
it satisfies Symmetry. In fact it is the only claims independent parametric rule to
satisfy Symmetry.
Theorem 3 The constrained equal awards rule is the only rule to satisfy Resource
Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA, and Symmetry.
The proof is straightforward given Theorem 1, and so is omitted. We note that
adding IIA to the set of axioms in Young (1987, Theorem 1) would give the same
result. Thus we could replace Resource Monotonicity with the assumption that S is
continuous in Theorem 3 and the result would still hold.
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Even if one thought the claimants should be treated equally, it may be the case
that there is other information known about the claimants (other than their claims)
that would cause one not to want to impose Symmetry. For example, suppose that
each claimant had an endowment wi of the good which could not be taken from the
claimant. Then one may want the rule to sometimes allocate less to individuals who
have larger endowments.
We formalize this as follows. A problem is now a tuple (N, c, w,E), where N ∈ N ,
c ∈ RN++, w ∈ RN+ , and E ∈ R+, all satisfying
∑
i∈N ci ≤ E. The variables N , c,
and E are as before, but here w represents the vector of endowments, which doesn’t
put any additional constraint on the problem. Let X(N, c, w,E) denote the set of
efficient awards vectors for the problem (N, c, w,E), i.e.
X(N, c, w,E) ≡
{
x ∈ RN+ : 0 5 x 5 c and
∑
i∈N
xi = E
}
.
A division rule is a function S such that for every problem (N, c, w,E), we have
S(N, c, w,E) ∈ X(N, c, w,E).
Outcome Symmetry. For every problem (N, c, w,E) and {i, j} ∈ N , if ci +
wi = cj + wj, wj ≤ wi, and Sj(N, c, w,E) ≥ wi − wj, then Si(N, c, w,E) + wi =
Sj(N, c, w,E) + wj.
Here, we think of the sum Si(N, c, w,E) +wi as being the outcome for individual
i. Appropriate modifications of Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, and
IIA do not involve w, and are thus omitted.
The constrained equal outcomes rule gives everyone the same outcome, unless that
outcome implies a claimant receives either a negative award or more than his claim,
in which case that claimant receives either zero or his full claim respectively:
CEO(N, c, w,E) = (min{ci,max{0, λ− wi}})i∈N
where λ is chosen such that
∑
N CEOi(N, c, w,E) = E. See Figure 5
Theorem 4 The constrained equal outcome rule is the only rule to satisfy Resource
Monotonicity, Bilateral Consistency, IIA, and Outcome Symmetry.
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Figure 5: Constrained Equal Outcome Rule. The paths of awards for the con-
strained equal outcomes rules for two different claims vectors.
Appendix
Throughout the appendix, we shorten notation by writing the problem (N, c, E) as
(c, E), as the group of claimants N is implicit in the claims vector c.
A Proof of Theorem 1
It is a straightforward exercise to show that each of these families of rules satisfies
the axioms.
So we show that the axioms are sufficient to get each family of rules, i.e. we show
that statement 1 implies 2, 3, and 4. Let S satisfy Bilateral Consistency, Resource
Monotonicity, and IIA. It is straightforward to show that Resource Monotonicity
implies the following continuity axiom.
Resource Continuity. For every (c, E), for every sequence (Ek)k∈N where Ek → E,
we have S(c, Ek)→ S(c, E).
We follow the general proof strategy of Kaminski (2000, 2006) and Stovall (2013)
by defining a binary relation over a suitable outcome space. The key step in the proof
is showing that this binary relation has a numerical representation.
For i 6= j and xi, xj > 0, define:
G(i, xi, j, xj) ≡ inf{E : xi = Si((xi, xj), E)}
Resource Continuity implies that we can replace inf with min. Note that we always
have G(i, xi, j, xj) ≤ xi + xj. Set
Y ≡ N× R+
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and define the binary relation R1 over Y as follows:
(i, xi)R1(j, xj) if i 6= j and either xi = 0 or G(i, xi, j, xj) ≤ G(j, xj, i, xi).
Note that if (i, xi)R1(j, xj) and xj = 0, then it must be that xi = 0. Define the binary
relation R2 over Y as follows:
(i, xi)R2(j, xj) if i = j and xi ≤ xj.
Set R ≡ R1 ∪R2.
A.1 R Has a Numerical Representation
We show that R is complete, transitive, and that there exists a countable R-dense
subset of Y . Thus, by Cantor’s classic result, R has a numerical representation.
By definition, it is obvious that R is complete. The following series of lemmas
prove the other properties.
Lemma 1 Suppose i 6= j and xi, xj > 0. Then (i, xi)R1(j, xj) if and only if G(j, xj, i, xi) =
xi + xj.
Proof. Let Ei = G(i, xi, j, xj) and E
j = G(j, xj, i, xi). Note that Si((xi, xj), E
i) = xi
and Sj((xi, xj), E
j) = xj. Suppose E
i ≤ Ej. Then Resource Monotonicity implies
Si((xi, xj), E
j) = xi, which implies xi+xj = E
j. Going the other direction, if Ei > Ej,
then Resource Monotonicity implies Sj((xi, xj), E
i) = xj. Hence E
i = xi + xj > E
j.
Thus for i 6= j and xi, xj > 0, (i, xi)P1(j, xj) if and only if G(i, xi, j, xj) < xi + xj.
Lemma 2 For every (i, xi), (j, xj), (k, xk) ∈ Y where i, j, k are distinct and xi, xj, xk >
0, there exists E such that
S((xi, xj, xk), E) = (G(k, xk, i, xi)− xk, G(k, xk, j, xj)− xk, xk).
Proof. Set
E ≡ G(k, xk, i, xi) +G(k, xk, j, xj)− xk
and
(yi, yj, yk) ≡ S((xi, xj, xk), E).
We show that we must have yi+yk = G(k, xk, i, xi) and yj+yk = G(k, xk, j, xj). By
way of contradiction, assume without loss of generality that yi + yk < G(k, xk, i, xi).
Then since yi+yj+yk = E it must be that yj+yk > G(k, xk, j, xj). But then Bilateral
Consistency and Resource Monotonicity would imply both yk < xk and yk = xk.
Since yi + yk = G(k, xk, i, xi), Bilateral Consistency implies that yk = xk. This
implies yi = G(k, xk, i, xi)− xk. Similarly, we have yj = G(k, xk, j, xj)− xk.
Lemma 3 Suppose i 6= j, xi, xj > 0, and (j, xj)R1(i, xi). Set E∗ ≡ G(j, xj, i, xi) and
x∗i ≡ E∗ − xj. Then for any (ci, cj) ≥ (x∗i , xj), we have S((ci, cj), E∗) = (x∗i , xj).
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Proof. First consider the case when (ci, cj) ≥ (xi, xj). Then X((xi, xj), E) ⊂
X((ci, cj), E) for every E ≤ xi + xj. Also note that Lemma 1 implies E∗ ≤ xi + xj,
which implies x∗i ≤ xi.
Note that for every E ′ ≤ min{xi, xj}, we have X((xi, xj), E ′) = X((ci, cj), E ′),
and so IIA implies S((xi, xj), E
′) = S((ci, cj), E ′). Thus if E∗ ≤ min{xi, xj}, then
we are done since S((xi, xj), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj). So assume E
∗ > min{xi, xj}. Note
also that for every E ′′ < E∗, we have Sj((xi, xj), E ′′) < xj (by definition of E∗) and
Si((xi, xj), E
′′) < xi (since (j, xj)R1(i, xi)). Thus for every E ′ ≤ min{xi, xj} < E∗,
we have Sj((ci, cj), E
′) < xj and Si((ci, cj), E ′) < xi.
So set E1 ≡ min{xi, xj} and (y1i , y1j ) ≡ S((ci, cj), E1) = S((xi, xj), E1). Thus
y1i < xi and y
1
j < xj.
Set E2 ≡ min{E∗, E1 + min{xi − y1i , xj − y1j}} and (y2i , y2j ) ≡ S((ci, cj), E2).
Resource Monotonicity implies that (y2i , y
2
j ) ≥ (y1i , y1j ). Since y2i ≥ y1i , we have
y2j = E
2 − y2i ≤ E2 − y1i . But by definition, E2 ≤ E1 + xj − y1j , and thus y2j ≤
E1 + xj − y1j − y1i . But since y1j + y1i = E1, this implies y2j ≤ xj. Similarly, we can
show y2i ≤ xi. Thus we have (0, 0) 5 (y2i , y2j ) 5 (xi, xj) and y2i +y2j = E2, which means
(y2i , y
2
j ) ∈ X((xi, xj), E2). IIA then implies (y2i , y2j ) = S((ci, cj), E2) = S((xi, xj), E2).
If E2 = E∗, then we have proved the result since S((xi, xj), E∗) = (x∗i , xj). So assume
E2 < E∗. Thus we have y2i < xi and y
2
j < xj.
Similarly, for n = 3, 4, . . ., set En ≡ min{E∗, En−1 + min{xi − yn−1i , xj − yn−1j }}
and (yni , y
n
j ) ≡ S((ci, cj), En). As before, we can show (yni , ynj ) = S((ci, cj), En) =
S((xi, xj), E
n). Again, if En = E∗ for any n, then we are done. So we assume
En < E∗ for every n. Thus yni < xi and y
n
j < xj.
Now we show En → E∗. So suppose not, i.e. En → Eˆ < E∗. Then since En < E∗
by assumption, we must have min{xi − yni , xj − ynj } → 0. So either yni → xi or
ynj → xj. If the former, then S((xi, xj), En) = (yni , ynj ) → (xi, Eˆ − xi). Resource
Continuity implies then that S((xi, xj), Eˆ) = (xi, Eˆ − xi). But then by definition of
E∗ and the fact that (j, xj)R1(i, xi), we must have Eˆ ≥ E∗, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, we get a contradiction if ynj → xj.
Since En → E∗, Resource Continuity implies S((ci, cj), En)→ S((ci, cj), E∗) and
S((xi, xj), E
n)→ S((xi, xj), E∗) = (x∗i , xj). But since S((ci, cj), En) = S((xi, xj), En)
for every n, we must have S((ci, cj), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj). This proves the result for (ci, cj) ≥
(xi, xj).
Now take any (ci, cj) ≥ (x∗i , xj). Set (c′i, c′j) = (max{ci, xi}, cj). Then by the
above result, we have S((c′i, c
′
j), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj). But (x
∗
i , xj) ∈ X((ci, cj), E∗). Hence
IIA implies S((ci, cj), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj).
Lemma 4 R is transitive.
Proof. Let (i, xi)R(j, xj)R(k, xk). The proof is straightforward if either xi, xj, or xk
is 0. Hence assume xi, xj, xk > 0.
Case 1: i, j, k distinct.
By way of contradiction, suppose (k, xk)P1(i, xi). Then Lemma 1 implies
G(k, xk, i, xi) < xi + xk. (1)
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By Lemma 2, there exists E such that
S((x1, x2, x3), E) = (G(k, xk, i, xi)− xk, G(k, xk, j, xj)− xk, xk).
For brevity, set yi ≡ G(k, xk, i, xi) − xk and yj ≡ G(k, xk, j, xj) − xk. Lemma 1
implies G(k, xk, j, xj) = xj + xk. Hence yj = xj. Bilateral Consistency implies
S((xi, xj), yi + xj) = (yi, xj). However since G(i, xi, j, xj) ≤ G(j, xj, i, xi), Resource
Monotonicity implies yi = xi. Hence G(k, xk, i, xi) = xi + xk, which contradicts (1).
Case 2: i = k 6= j.
So let x′i = xk. We need to show that xi ≤ x′i. By way of contradiction, suppose
xi > x
′
i. Let E
1 = x′i + xj and E
2 = xi + xj. Then E
1 < E2. Set E∗ = G(j, xj, i, x′i).
By Lemma 1 we have E1 = G(i, x′i, j, xj). Hence (j, xj)R1(i, x
′
i) implies E
∗ ≤ E1.
Lemma 1 also implies E2 = G(j, xj, i, xi). But Lemma 3 implies S((xi, xj), E
∗) =
(x∗i , xj), which means we must have E
2 ≤ E∗. But then E2 ≤ E1, which is a
contradiction.
Case 3: i = j 6= k.
So let x′i = xj. Then xi ≤ x′i by definition of R2. By way of contradiction, suppose
(k, xk)P1(i, xi). Since (i, x
′
i)R1(k, xk), Case 2 above implies x
′
i ≤ xi. Hence x′i = xi.
But then we have (k, xk)P1(i, xi) and (i, xi)R1(k, xk), a contradiction.
Case 4: i 6= j = k.
Similar to Case 3.
Case 5: i = j = k.
Then xi ≤ xj ≤ xk.
Lemma 5 N×Q++ is an R-dense subset of Y .
Proof. Let (i, xi)P (j, xj). Then we must have xj > 0. (If xj = 0, then (j, xj)R(i, xi)
which contradicts (i, xi)P (j, xj).)
Case 1: i = j.
Then xi < xj, so the result follows from the fact that Q is dense in R.
Case 2: i 6= j and xi = 0.
Then for any x′j ∈ (0, xj), we must have (i, xi)P (j, x′j)P (j, xj). The result follows
from Case 1 and transitivity.
Case 3: i 6= j and xi > 0.
Set E∗ ≡ G(i, xi, j, xj) and x∗j ≡ E∗ − xi. Obviously S((xi, xj), E∗) = (xi, x∗j).
Lemma 1 implies G(i, xi, j, xj) < xi+xj, which implies xj > x
∗
j . Choose x
′
j ∈ (x∗j , xj)∩
Q. Then (j, x′j)P (j, xj) by definition. By way of contradiction, suppose (j, x′j)P (i, xi).
Set E ′ ≡ G(j, x′j, i, xi) and x′i ≡ E ′ − x′j. Lemma 1 implies G(j, x′j, i, xi) < xi + x′j,
which implies xi > x
′
i. Lemma 3 implies that S((xi, xj), E
′) = (x′i, x
′
j). But as we al-
ready noted above S((xi, xj), E
∗) = (xi, x∗j), and since xi > x
′
i, Resource Monotonicity
implies that x∗j ≥ x′j, which is a contradiction. Hence it must be that (i, xi)R(j, x′j).
Hence R is complete, transitive, and there exists a countable R-dense subset of
Y . Thus there exists r : Y → R such that
(i, xi)R(j, xj)⇔ r(i, xi) ≤ r(j, xj).
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Note that for every i, r(i, ·) is strictly increasing.
Before continuing, we prove the following lemma, which will be useful in what
follows.
Lemma 6 Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E). Set λ∗ ≡ maxi∈N{r(i, xi)}. Then for
every i ∈ N where xi < ci,
r(i, xi) ≤ λ∗ ≤ lim
x′i ↓xi
r(i, x′i).
Proof. Obviously r(i, xi) ≤ λ∗. If r(i, xi) = λ∗, then the result obviously holds since
r(i, ·) is strictly increasing. So suppose r(i, xi) < λ∗ = r(j, xj) for some j ∈ N such
that j 6= i.
We show that for every x′i ∈ (xi, ci), we have λ∗ < r(i, x′i). By way of contradiction,
suppose λ∗ = r(j, xj) ≥ r(i, x′i). Since r(i, ·) is strictly increasing, we can assume
r(j, xj) > r(i, x
′
i) without loss of generality. Note that x
′
i > xi ≥ 0. Thus λ∗ ≥ r(i, x′i)
implies that xj > 0. So set E
∗ ≡ G(i, x′i, j, xj) and x∗j ≡ E∗ − x′i. Lemma 1 implies
E∗ = x′i+x
∗
j < x
′
i+xj, which implies x
∗
j < xj. By Lemma 3, S((ci, cj), E
∗) = (x′i, x
∗
j).
However Bilateral Consistency implies S((ci, cj), xi+xj) = (xi, xj). Since xi < x
′
i and
xj > x
∗
j , this must violate Resource Monotonicity.
Thus for x′i ∈ (xi, ci), we have λ∗ < r(i, x′i). Hence we must have λ∗ ≤ limx′i ↓xi r(i, x′i).
A.2 Claims Independent Parametric Rule
Here we show that S must be a claims independent parametric rule.
For λ ∈ R, define
fi(λ) ≡
{
0 if λ < r(i, 0)
sup{xi : r(i, xi) ≤ λ} if λ ≥ r(i, 0)
.
Lemma 7 For every (i, xi) ∈ Y , we have fi(r(i, xi)) = xi.
Proof. Fix (i, xi) ∈ Y . Since r(i, ·) is increasing, we have
{x′i : r(i, x′i) ≤ r(i, xi)} = {x′i : x′i ≤ xi}.
Hence fi(r(i, xi)) = sup{x′i : x′i ≤ xi} = xi.
Lemma 8 f ≡ {fi}N ∈ F .
Proof. Fix i ∈ N .
First we show fi is weakly increasing. Let λ, λ
′ ∈ R be given where λ < λ′. If
λ < r(i, 0), then fi(λ) = 0. Since the definition of fi implies fi(λ
′) ≥ 0, we have
fi(λ) ≤ fi(λ′). If λ ≥ r(i, 0), then observe that ∅ 6= {xi : r(i, xi) ≤ λ} ⊂ {xi :
r(i, xi) ≤ λ′}. Hence fi(λ) ≤ fi(λ′).
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Next we show fi is continuous. Suppose fi were discontinuous. Then since fi is
weakly increasing, there must exist x0 ∈ R+ such that x0 is not in the image of fi.
But this is a contradiction since λ = r(i, x0) ∈ R and fi(λ) = x0 by Lemma 7.
Finally we show fi(−∞) = 0 and fi(+∞) = +∞. Note that −∞ < r(i, 0). Hence
fi(−∞) = 0 by definition of fi. Note that +∞ ≥ r(i, xi) for every xi ∈ R+. Hence
fi(+∞) = supR+ = +∞.
Lemma 9 S = Sf .
Proof. Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E). Set λ∗ ≡ maxi∈N{r(i, xi)}. Fix i ∈ N .
Note that λ∗ ≥ r(i, xi), which means fi(λ∗) ≥ fi(r(i, xi)) since fi is weakly in-
creasing. Lemma 7 then implies fi(λ
∗) ≥ xi.
If xi = ci, then min{fi(λ∗), ci} = ci, which proves the result. So assume xi < ci.
By Lemma 6, λ∗ ≤ limx′i ↓xi r(i, x′i). Thus fi(λ∗) ≤ fi(limx′i ↓xi r(i, x′i)) since fi is
weakly increasing. But then Lemma 7 and continuity of fi imply fi(λ
∗) ≤ xi. We
have thus established that for the case where xi < ci, we must have fi(λ
∗) = xi. Thus
min{fi(λ∗), ci} = xi.
A.3 Monotone Path Rule
Here we show that S must be a monotone path rule.
Set
p(t) = (fi(g(t)))i∈N
where g is any strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R. For example: g(t) = 1− 1
2t
for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2
and g(t) = t
1−t − 1 for 12 < t ≤ 1.
Lemma 10 p ∈ P.
Proof. Since g is a strictly increasing bijection from [0, 1] to R, we must have
g(0) = −∞ and g(1) = +∞. Also, Lemma 8 establishes that fi(−∞) = 0 and
fi(+∞) = +∞ for every i ∈ N. Hence p(0) = 0 and p(1) = Ω. Also, p must be
weakly monotone and continuous since g is increasing and continuous and each fi is
weakly increasing and continuous.
Lemma 11 S = Sp.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 9.
A.4 CRAS Rule
Here we show that S must be a CRAS rule.
Since r(i, a) is strictly increasing, it is Riemann integrable. Define
Ui(x0) ≡ −
∫ x0
0
r(i, a) da.
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Lemma 12 U ≡ {Ui}N ∈ U .
Proof. Fix i ∈ N. First we show Ui is strictly concave. Fix x, x′ ∈ R+ such that
x < x′. Fix α ∈ (0, 1). Set xˆ ≡ αx+ (1− α)x′. Note that
Ui(xˆ) = Ui(x)−
∫ xˆ
x
r(i, a) da
and
αUi(x) + (1− α)Ui(x′) = Ui(x)− (1− α)
∫ x′
x
r(i, a) da
= Ui(x)−
∫ xˆ
x
r(i, a) da+ α
∫ xˆ
x
r(i, a) da− (1− α)
∫ x′
xˆ
r(i, a) da.
Hence, Ui is strictly concave if and only if
α
∫ xˆ
x
r(i, a) da− (1− α)
∫ x′
xˆ
r(i, a) da < 0.
But since x < xˆ < x′ and since r(i, a) is strictly increasing, we have∫ xˆ
x
r(i, a) da <
∫ xˆ
x
r(i, xˆ) da = (1− α)(x′ − x)r(i, xˆ)
and ∫ x′
xˆ
r(i, a) da >
∫ x′
xˆ
r(i, xˆ) da = α(x′ − x)r(i, xˆ),
which, inputting into the above equation, gives the result.
The continuity of Ui follows from the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus.
Lemma 13 Suppose i 6= j, xi, xj > 0 and (j, xj)P1(i, xi). Set x∗i ≡ G(j, xj, i, xi)−xj.
Then for any x′i ∈ (x∗i , xi), we have (j, xj)P1(i, x′i).
Proof. Lemma 1 implies G(j, xj, i, xi) < xi + xj = G(i, xi, j, xj). Thus x
∗
i < xi so
(x∗i , xi) is not empty. Fix x
′
i ∈ (x∗i , xi). Lemma 3 implies S((x′i, xj), G(j, xj, i, xi)) =
(x∗i , xj). Thus G(j, xj, i, x
′
i) ≤ G(j, xj, i, xi). Since x′i > x∗i = G(j, xj, i, xi) − xj, we
have G(j, xj, i, x
′
i) < x
′
i + xj. Lemma 1 then implies (j, xj)P1(i, x
′
i).
Lemma 14 For every i ∈ N and xi ∈ R+, it is without loss of generality to assume
limx′i↑xi r(i, x
′
i) = r(i, xi).
Proof. If xi = 0, then the only sequence in R+ below 0 is the sequence of zeros.
Hence limx′i↑0 r(i, x
′
i) = r(i, 0).
So assume xi > 0. Since r(i, ·) is strictly increasing, we obviously have limx′i↑xi r(i, x′i) ≤
r(i, xi). By way of contradiction, suppose a ≡ limx′i↑xi r(i, x′i) < r(i, xi). Note
that without loss of generality, we can assume that there exists (j, xj) ∈ Y where
j 6= i such that r(j, xj) ∈ (a, r(i, xi)). (If no such (j, xj) existed, then we could “cut
out” the discontinuity at (i, xi) without changing the ordering of r, and thus have
a = r(i, xi).) Then for every x
′
i ∈ (0, xi), we have r(i, x′i) < r(j, xj) < r(i, xi).
But then (j, xj)P1(i, xi), so Lemma 13 implies that r(j, xj) < r(i, x
′
i) for every
x′i ∈ (G(j, xj, i, xi)− xj, xi), which is a contradiction.
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Lemma 15 Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ SU(c, E). Suppose 0 < E < ∑N ci. Then there
exists λ∗ such that for every i ∈ N where xi < ci,
r(i, xi) ≤ λ∗ ≤ lim
x′i ↓xi
r(i, x′i).
Proof. Set C ≡ {y ∈ RN : 0 5 y 5 c}. Note that x is the unique solution to the
problem
min
y∈C
∑
i∈N
−Ui(yi) subject to E −
∑
i∈N
yi = 0.
Also note that there exists y in the interior of C such that E =
∑
N yi and
∑
N −Ui(yi)
is finite. Hence (Rockafellar, 1970, Corollary 28.2.2), there exists λ∗ such that x is
the solution to
min
y∈C
[∑
i∈N
−Ui(yi) + λ∗
(
E −
∑
i∈N
yi
)]
= λ∗E +
∑
i∈N
min
yi∈[0,ci]
[−Ui(yi)− λ∗yi] .
Thus for every i and yi ∈ [0, ci], we have −Ui(yi) − λ∗yi ≥ −Ui(xi) − λ∗xi. So if
xi ∈ [0, ci), then −Ui(yi) − λ∗yi ≥ −Ui(xi) − λ∗xi for every yi ∈ R+ since −Ui(yi) is
strictly convex (by Lemma 12). Thus for every i where xi < ci, λ
∗ is a subderivative
of −Ui(·) at xi. Thus by Lemma 14 and (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 24.2), we have
r(i, xi) ≤ λ∗ ≤ limx′i ↓xi r(i, x′i).
Lemma 16 S = SU .
Proof. Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E) and xU ≡ SU(c, E). Obviously if E = 0 then
x = xU = 0. Also, if E =
∑
N ci then x = x
U = c. So assume 0 < E <
∑
N ci. By
Lemma 6, we have (setting λ ≡ maxi∈N{r(i, xi)})
r(i, xi) ≤ λ ≤ lim
x′i ↓xi
r(i, x′i)
for every i ∈ N where xi < ci. By Lemma 15, there exists λU such that
r(i, xUi ) ≤ λU ≤ lim
x′i ↓xUi
r(i, x′i)
for every i ∈ N where xUi < ci.
By way of contradiction, suppose x 6= xU . Then there exists i ∈ N such that
xi 6= xUi . If xUi < xi ≤ ci, then limx′i ↓xUi r(i, x′i) < r(i, xi) since r(i, ·) is strictly
increasing. Note that r(i, xi) ≤ λ (even if xi = ci) by definition of λ. Hence λU < λ.
But this implies xUj ≤ xj for every j ∈ N , which implies
∑
N x
U
j <
∑
N xj. But this
is a contradiction since both equal E. If xi < x
U
i ≤ ci, then by similar reasoning we
get a contradiction. Hence we must have x = xU .
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B Example Violating Resource Monotonicity
Instead of describing the paths of awards for the rule as we did in Section 3, we will
define a function that is almost parametric. This function will be parametric for every
i ∈ N (meaning fi satisfies the conditions of a parametric function) except for i = 2,
which will have f2 not weakly increasing.
Let fˆ ∈ F satisfy fˆ1(0) = +∞ and fˆi(0) = 0 for all i 6= 1. Thus fˆ gives priority
to claimant 1 over all the other claimants. Also assume fˆ1 is strictly increasing and
concave on the interval (−∞, 0) (i.e. fˆ ′1(λ) > 0 and fˆ ′′1 (λ) ≥ 0) and that fˆi is strictly
increasing on the interval (0,+∞) for every i 6= 1. Define the function f from fˆ as
follows: fi = fˆi for every i 6= 2. For i = 2, let
f2(λ) =

f1(λ) λ < a
−
b−a(λ− a) + f1(a) a ≤ λ < b
f1(λ)− f1(b) + f1(a)−  λ ≥ b
for some fixed a, b, and  satisfying −∞ < a < b < 0, 0 <  < f1(a), and b−a < f ′1(a).
Thus we have the following: f2(−∞) = 0, f2(0) = +∞, and f1 + f2 is strictly
increasing on the interval (−∞, 0).
For N ∈ N where either 1, 2 ∈ N or 2 6∈ N , and for any c ∈ RN++, the function∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} is continuous and increasing in λ, and that
∑
i∈N min{fi(−∞), ci} =
0 and
∑
i∈N min{fi(+∞), ci} =
∑
i∈N ci. Hence, for any E satisfying 0 ≤ E ≤
∑
ci,
there exists λ ∈ R such that ∑i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} = E. Furthermore, if λ and λ′
are such that
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} =
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ′), ci} = E, then it must be that
min{fi(λ), ci} = min{fi(λ′), ci} for every i ∈ N .
ForN ∈ N where 2 ∈ N and 1 6∈ N , and for c ∈ RN++, the function
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci}
is continuous and satisfies
∑
i∈N min{fi(−∞), ci} = 0 and
∑
i∈N min{fi(+∞), ci} =∑
i∈N ci. Hence, for any E satisfying 0 ≤ E ≤
∑
ci, there exists λ ∈ R such that∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} = E. However note that
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci}may not be increas-
ing. However here it does not matter because individual 2 is given priority over every
individual i 6= 1. Thus as before, if λ and λ′ are such that ∑i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} =∑
i∈N min{fi(λ′), ci} = E, then it must be that min{fi(λ), ci} = min{fi(λ′), ci} for
every i ∈ N .
So we can define a division rule Sf as:
Sf (N, c, E) = (min{fi(λ), ci})i∈N ,
where λ is chosen such that
∑
i∈N min{fi(λ), ci} = E.
Obviously Sf does not satisfy Resource Monotonicity.
To see that Sf satisfies Consistency, let (N, c, E) and N ′ ⊂ N be given. Set
x = S(N, c, E). Then there exists λ such that xi = min{fi(λ), ci} for every i ∈ N .
But then λ also satisfies
∑
N ′ min{fi(λ), ci} =
∑
N ′ xi. Thus by the definition of S
f ,
we have S(N ′, cN ′ ,
∑
N ′ xi) = xN ′ .
To see that Sf satisfies IIA, let (N, c, E) and c′ satisfy S(N, c, E) 5 c′ 5 c.
Thus there exists λ such that for every i ∈ N , we have min{fi(λ), ci} ≤ c′i ≤ ci. If
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min{fi(λ), ci} = fi(λ), then we have fi(λ) ≤ c′i. If min{fi(λ), ci} = ci, then we have
ci = c
′
i. In either case, we must have min{fi(λ), c′i} = min{fi(λ), ci}. Note then that∑
N min{fi(λ), c′i} =
∑
N min{fi(λ), ci} = E. Thus by definition of Sf , we must have
S(N, c′, E) = (min{fi(λ), c′i})N , which means S(N, c′, E) = S(N, c, E).
C Proof of Theorem 2
Let S satisfy Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, IIA, and IIA-Dual.
Define the binary relation  over N as follows: i  j if i 6= j and there exists
(ci, cj) ∈ R{i,j}++ such that Si((ci, cj), ci) = ci. The following lemmas demonstrate that
 is a strict linear order over N.
Lemma 17 It is never the case that for N = {i, j} ⊂ N, c ∈ R{i,j}++ , and E ∈
(0, ci + cj), that we have 0 < S(c, E) < c.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose there exists N = {i, j} ⊂ N, c ∈ R{i,j}++ ,
and E ∈ (0, ci + cj) such that 0 < S(c, E) < c. Without loss of generality, assume
ci ≤ cj. There exists  > 0 such that 2 < Si(c, E) < ci − 2. Set c′ ≡ (ci − , cj + ).
Note that for E ≤ cj, we have X(c′, E) ⊂ X(c, E) and S(c, E) ∈ X(c′, E). Thus
IIA implies S(c, E) = S(c′, E). Similarly, for E ≥ ci, we have L(c′, E) ⊂ L(c, E) and
c− S(c, E) ∈ L(c′, E). Thus IIA implies c− S(c, E) = c′ − S(c′, E).
Suppose E ∈ [ci, cj]. Then we have S(c, E) = S(c′, E) and c − S(c, E) = c′ −
S(c′, E). But this implies c = c′, which is a contradiction.
Suppose E > cj. Then we have c−S(c, E) = c′−S(c′, E), which implies S(c, E) =
c− c′+S(c′, E) = S(c′, E) + (,−). Thus S(c, E) ∈ X(c′, E) and S(c′, E) ∈ X(c, E).
Consider the claim c′′ = (ci, cj + ). Note that X(c, E) ⊂ X(c′′, E) and X(c′, E) ⊂
X(c′′, E) and either S(c′′, E) ∈ X(c, E) or S(c′′, E) ∈ X(c′, E). If S(c′′, E) ∈ X(c, E),
then IIA implies S(c′′, E) = S(c, E). But since S(c, E) ∈ X(c′, E), IIA implies
S(c′′, E) = S(c′, E). Thus S(c, E) = S(c′, E). But then we get c = c′ which is a
contradiction. Similarly, we get a contradiction if S(c′′, E) ∈ X(c′, E).
Similarly, if E < ci, we get a contradiction. But that exhausts all possible values
of E.
Lemma 18 For every {i, j} ⊂ N, either i  j or j  i, but not both.
Proof. Fix {i, j} ⊂ N. Lemma 17 implies that either i  j or j  i. We now show
that both cannot be true. By way of contradiction, suppose both i  j and j  i.
Thus there exists (ci, cj) ∈ R{i,j}++ and (c′i, c′j) ∈ R{i,j}++ such that S((ci, cj), ci) = (ci, 0)
and S((c′i, c
′
j), c
′
j) = (0, c
′
j). But then Lemma 3 implies that both S((ci, c
′
j), ci) = (ci, 0)
and S((ci, c
′
j), c
′
j) = (0, c
′
j), which must contradict Resource Monotonicity.
Lemma 19  is transitive.
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Proof. Let i  j and j  k. By Lemma 18, for any ci, cj, ck > 0, we have
Si((ci, cj), ci) = ci and Sj((cj, ck), cj) = cj. Note then that we must haveG(j, cj, i, ci) =
ci + cj and G(j, cj, k, ck) = cj. Lemma 2 implies there exists E such that
S((ci, cj, ck), E) = (G(j, cj, i, ci)− cj, cj, G(j, cj, k, ck)− cj) = (ci, cj, 0).
Bilateral Consistency then implies S((ci, ck), ci) = (ci, 0). Thus i  k by definition.
We now complete the proof by showing that S must be the queueing rule.
Lemma 20 S = S.
Proof. Fix (c, E) and set x ≡ S(c, E). Let {i, j} ∈ N . We show i  j if and only
if xj = cj implies xi = ci. Bilateral Consistency implies (xi, xj) = S((ci, cj), xi + xj).
Suppose i  j and xj = cj. Then Lemmas 17 and 18 imply S((ci, cj), ci) = (ci, 0).
Resource Monotonicity then implies xi = ci. Going the other direction, suppose that
xj = cj implies xi = ci. Then it cannot be that S((ci, cj), cj) = (0, cj). Hence j 6 i.
By Lemma 18 we must have i  j.
D Proof of Theorem 4
Let S satisfy Bilateral Consistency, Resource Monotonicity, IIA, and Outcome Sym-
metry. For i 6= j and xi, xj > 0, define:
G′(i, xi, wi, j, xj, wj) ≡ inf{E : xi = Si((xi, xj), (wi, wj), E)}
Resource Continuity implies that we can replace inf with min.
Lemma 21 Suppose i 6= j, xi, xj > 0, and G(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) ≤ G(i, xi, wi, j, xj, wj).
Set E∗ ≡ G(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) and x∗i ≡ E∗ − xj. Then for any (ci, cj) ≥ (x∗i , xj), we
have S((ci, cj), (wi, wj), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj).
The proof is similar to the proof for Lemma 3, and so is omitted.
Lemma 22 Suppose i 6= j and xi, xj > 0. Then G(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) ≤ G(i, xi, wi, j, xj, wj)
if and only if xj + wj ≤ xi + wi.
Proof. (⇒) Set E∗ ≡ G(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) and x∗i ≡ E∗ − xj. Note that x∗i ≤ xi.
Case 1. wi ≥ wj and xj < wi − wj.
Then xj + wj < wi < wi + xi.
Case 2. wi ≥ wj and xj ≥ wi − wj.
Choose any (ci, cj) ≥ (x∗i , xj) such that ci + wi = cj + wj. By Lemma 21,
S((ci, cj), (wi, wj), E
∗) = (x∗i , xj). By Outcome Symmetry, xj+wj = x
∗
i +wi ≤ xi+wi.
Case 3. wi < wj.
First we show that we must have x∗i ≥ wj − wi. If x∗i < wj − wi, then set x′i ≡
wj−wi+xj > x∗i . Then by Lemma 21, we have S((x′i, xj), (wi, wj), E∗) = (x∗i , xj). But
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then Outcome Symmetry implies x∗i + wi = xj + wj. Hence x
∗
i = x
′
i, a contradiction.
Hence x∗i ≥ wj−wi. So similar to Case 2, we can show using Lemma 21 and Outcome
Symmetry that xj + wj = x
∗
i + wi ≤ xi + wi.
(⇐) We prove the contrapositive. So supposeG(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) < G(i, xi, wi, j, xj, wj).
Set E∗ ≡ G(j, xj, wj, i, xi, wi) and x∗i ≡ E∗ − xj. Note that x∗i < xi. Following the
three cases above, one can show xj + wj < xi + wi.
Lemma 23 Fix (c, w,E) and set x ≡ S(c, w,E). For every i, j ∈ N where 0 < xi <
ci and 0 < xj < cj, we have xi + wi = xj + wj.
Proof. Suppose i, j ∈ N satisfy 0 < xi < ci, 0 < xj < cj, and xi + wi < xj +
wj. Then choose x
′
i ∈ (xi,min{ci, xj + wj − wi}). Thus x′i + wi < xj + wj and
0 < xi < x
′
i < ci. Lemma 22 implies G(i, x
′
i, wi, j, xj, wj) < G(j, xj, wj, i, x
′
i, wi).
Set E∗ ≡ G(i, x′i, wi, j, xj, wj) and x∗j ≡ E∗ − x′i. Note x∗j < xj. Then Lemma
21 implies S((ci, cj), (wi, wj), E
∗) = (x′i, x
∗
j). However Bilateral Consistency implies
S((ci, cj), (wi, wj), xi + xj) = (xi, xj). Since xi < x
′
i and xj > x
∗
j , this must violate
Resource Consistency.
Set
fi(λ) =
{
0 if λ < wi
λ− wi if λ ≥ wi
= max{0, λ− wi}.
Using Lemma 23, it is straightforward to show that S = Sf .
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